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Abstract. By the Chinese room thought experiment, John Searle (1980) advocates the thesis that it is impos-
sible for computers to think in the same way that human beings do. This article intends firstly to show that 
the Chinese room does not justify or even test this thesis and secondly to describe exactly how the person in 
the Chinese room can learn Chinese. Regarding this learning process, Searle ignores the relevance of an indi-
vidual’s pattern recognition capacity for understanding. To counter Searle’s claim, this paper, via examining 
a series of thought experiments inspired by the Chinese room, aims to underline the importance of pattern 
recognition for understanding to emerge.
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Teisingesnė „kinų kambario“ versija
Santrauka. Naudodamasis „kinų kambario“ mintiniu eksperimentu, Johnas Searle’as (1980) gina teiginį, jog 
kompiuteriai negali mąstyti taip, kaip mąsto žmonės. Šiame straipsnyje pirmiausia ketinama parodyti, kad „kinų 
kambario“ eksperimentas ne tik kad nepagrindžia, bet net ir neišbando šios tezės, o, antra, paaiškinama, kaip 
kinų kambaryje sėdintis žmogus gali išmokti kinų kalbos. Kalbėdamas apie šį mokymosi procesą Searle’as 
ignoruoja tai, kokią svarbą supratimui turi asmens gebėjimas atpažinti struktūras. Nesutikdami su Searle’o 
teze, šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjame keletą kitų, kinų kambario įkvėptų, mintinių eksperimentų ir pabrėžiame 
struktūros atpažinimo svarbą supratimui atsirasti.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: dirbtinis intelektas, kinų kambarys, Turingo testas, supratimas, struktūros atpažinimas
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Searle, the Turing Test and Strong AI
After almost four decades of its publication, John Searle’s Chinese room thought ex-
periment (1980) still puzzles the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Using this thought 
experiment, Searle convincingly – but mistakenly in my opinion – defended that no 
matter how complex and well programmed a computer performing symbol manipulation 
is at present, and could be in the future, it cannot think in the manner human beings do. 
He also rejected Alan Turing’s (1964) claim that the Turing test is a sufficient condition 
for determining whether an AI system really thinks. Although the specifics of how the 
Turing test should be performed remains a controversial topic (Traiger 2000), the test can 
roughly be described as follows:
There is a computer and two humans. One human is the interrogator. She or he communicates 
with the computer and the other human using a teletype or computer terminal. The interroga-
tor is told that one of the two individuals it is communicating with is a computer, and that the 
other is a human. The computer’s goal is to fool the interrogator into thinking that it is the 
human. The other human’s goal is to convince the interrogator that he or she is the human. The 
computer attempts to achieve the deception by imitating human verbal behavior. If an inter-
rogator does not make the right identification, where a “right identification” is identifying the 
computer as a computer, then the computer passes the test. (Traiger 2000: 561)
According to Turing, if a computer can convince an interrogator that it is a human 
being as frequently as a human being can, the computer should be considered to be a 
thinking being or to possess human-like cognitive capacity. He further asserts that the 
other philosophically complicated concepts of thinking are vague and useless because 
they are not testable or verifiable, and that there is no acceptable concept of thinking to 
replace his behavioristic concept of thinking based on Turing test results (Turing 1964).
After a decade, Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson (1975) were working on a 
computer program (script applier mechanism [SAM]) capable of inferring implicit prop-
ositions in natural-language stories. The implicit propositions, which could be inferred by 
a human quite easily, were not logically necessary conclusions of the explicit statements 
in the stories. The following story is an example that SAM analyzed and answered the 
questions about: “John went to a restaurant. The hostess seated John. The waiter came to 
the table. John ordered lobster. John was served quickly. John left a large tip. John left the 
restaurant” (Schank and Abelson 1975: 153). Although the reason why John left a large tip 
is not explicitly stated, SAM was able to deduce that the probable reason was the quick 
service (Schank and Abelson 1975: 154). At the time, Schank and Abelson (1975: 155) 
estimated that with some improvement, their program (SAM) could understand simple 
stories about a range of domains.
In response to Turing (1964), Schank, and Ableson (1975); Searle (1980) posited that 
in the absence of a foundational scientific and/or engineering revolution that enables 
computers to perform tasks beyond symbol manipulation, no computer including ones 
that would pass Turing test can perform human-like thinking. He claims that insignificant 
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developments, like coding a software aiming to pass behavioral tests like the one Turing 
proposed, overlook one of the core concepts of the philosophy of mind: intentionality. 
In the Chinese room thought experiment, Searle imagines himself acting as a com-
puter that is trying to understand Chinese stories, where Searle has no knowledge of the 
Chinese language. He is placed in a room with some syntactic instructions (algorithm) in 
English that will help him to manipulate Chinese symbols properly. Next, some Chinese 
stories and Chinese questions about these stories are passed to Searle from outside the 
room and he tries to answer the questions in Chinese with the help of English instructions. 
The algorithm is so comprehensive and Searle is so skillful in applying it that he manages 
to prepare correct Chinese-language answers to the questions quickly, although he does 
not know the language. If all these are true, a Chinese-speaking individual who does not 
know what is happening in the Chinese room could possibly think that the person in the 
room understands Chinese. That is to say, Searle would be able to pass the Turing test in 
Chinese, without understanding anything about the stories, questions and his answers to 
the questions. In brief, this thought experiment shows that a person or a computer with 
no understanding, can manipulate symbols (Chinese letters) meaningfully, with the help 
of an algorithm. Accordingly, it is possible to pass the Turing test without understanding 
or thinking like a human being. 
This is a sound argument: The Turing test does not account for phenomenological, 
or at least the intentional aspect of thinking. Nevertheless, Searle bases a stronger and 
controversial conclusion on the Chinese room: no machine based on computational sym-
bol manipulation can perform human-like thinking. Needless to say, this is a negative 
existential statement, proof of which is more demanding than the one above. After all, in 
the Chinese room, Searle tests only a particular kind of algorithm for a particular kind of 
problem.1 Searle would not make the mistake of relying on the following invalid argument 
in reaching his stronger and much more controversial conclusion:2
1) In the room Searle acts as a computer that manipulates symbols in order to 
communicate in Chinese. 
2) Searle does not understand or think about content of Chinese symbols.
3) No computer using pure symbol manipulation can understand or think (which does 
not follow from 1 and 2).
Apparently, Searle uses at least one additional premise to show that (3) is true. One 
such premise that leads Searle to conclude (3) is that the person in the Chinese room has 
access to all the necessary tools that can be used by a computer for the task of understand-
ing. Another of Searle’s additional premises is that there exists no better algorithm for 
1  See Jerry Fodor’s comment in Searle 1980.
2  Searle seems to base his thesis on a clearly invalid argument in the following passage: “[…] I offer an argument 
that is very simple: instantiating a program could not be constitutive of intentionality, because it would be possible 
for an agent to instantiate the program and still not have the right kind of intentionality (Searle 1980: 450-451).” 
I certainly do not see how the possibility of an agent’s instantiating a program that does not have the right kind of 
intentionality show the impossibility of an agent’s instantiating a program that does have the right kind of intention-
ality. 
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understanding Chinese than the one the person in the Chinese room is given. And finally, 
no matter how long Searle stayed in the room, he could not start to understand Chinese. 
Without these additional premises, the Chinese room thought experiment cannot derive 
his controversial conclusion that no computer can perform human-like thinking. Unless 
he justifies these additional premises, a natural objection to Searle could be that even if 
the person in the room did not understand Chinese, if he used a better algorithm to com-
municate and understand Chinese, or if he had access to other tools a computer could, or 
if he had some more time experiencing symbol manipulation, he might have very well 
been able to understand Chinese. To prevent this objection, his argument suggesting that 
a computer cannot perform human-like thinking should be in the following form: 
1) In the room Searle acted as a computer that manipulates symbols in order to 
communicate in Chinese. 
2) (No matter how long Searle stayed in the room) Searle cannot understand or think 
about content of Chinese symbols. 
3) No computer could have a better algorithm or access to more useful tools for 
understanding or thinking about content of Chinese symbols than Searle in the 
Chinese room.
4) No computer can understand or think (from 1, 2 and 3).
Intuitively, Searle seems correct in that the person in the Chinese room would not have 
accurate intentional states related to Chinese symbols at least in a short while. That is to 
say, the person would be unaware of how the symbols are connected to the world outside 
the room. On the contrary, this paper argues that (2) and (3) are false. That is to say, given 
enough time, Searle in the room could actually understand Chinese stories to some extent. 
Moreover, if he were given access to some additional tools which a computer could have 
access to, he would understand Chinese stories much easier, faster and more in depth. 
As Searle points out, at the beginning, the person in the room would lack intention-
ality in the sense of directedness. Directedness, in its broadest definition, is the ability to 
establish relationships between mental and external objects. Both a standard computer 
and I may express the sentence, “The Moon is Earth’s natural satellite;” however, unlike 
me, a standard computer does not associate this statement with the two celestial objects. 
As far as a standard computer is concerned, the word Moon does not refer to a celestial 
body; therefore, it would be erroneous to assume that the computer understands that the 
Moon is Earth’s satellite. This problem is related to the difference between sentence and 
proposition or content and symbols. The central question concerning understanding is 
whether it is possible for semantics to emerge only from syntactical manipulation. Searle 
thinks it is not:
Computation is defined purely formally or syntactically, whereas minds have actual mental 
or semantic contents, and we cannot get from syntactical to the semantic just by having the 
syntactical operations and nothing else. To put this point slightly more technically, the notion 
“same implemented program” defines an equivalence class that is specified independently of 
any specific physical realization. But such a specification necessarily leaves out the biologi-
cally specific powers of the brain to cause cognitive processes (Searle 2010: 17).
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Could Searle be correct in his claim that there are some biological/physical causal 
properties of the human brain that render it something more than a computational symbol 
manipulator? In this paper, the puzzling concepts of “meaning,” “reference,” “intention-
ality” and relations between them are not investigated thoroughly, therefore this question 
is not answered conclusively. This paper mainly aims to show that Searle’s Chinese room 
did not succeed to show that a computer cannot think, functionalism is false and semantics 
cannot emerge on syntactical operations. To do that, first I will modify the Chinese room 
thought experiment in a way that the person in the room is given more data and a proper 
algorithm for decoding Chinese, and consequently, these modifications will enable the 
person in the room to start understanding Chinese. 
An Unfair Version of the Chinese Room (UVCR)
Proponents of robot reply underline the fact that in the Chinese room thought experiment, 
the person in the room does not have access to the external sensory data that a computer 
may have via a camera and/or a microphone and defends that this is the main reason why 
Searle in the room does not understand Chinese (Searle 1980: 431). The unfair version 
of the thought experiment (UVCR) that I will describe in this section, will intuitively 
support that robot reply is correct in that some set of relations between sensory data and 
syntax could help to bridge the gap between syntax and semantics. However, as its name 
suggests, this version of the Chinese room cannot be conclusive, as it gives the person in 
the room an unfair advantage that a computer does not possess. 
In UVCR a person enters the room with English-language instructions (algorithm), as 
in Searle’s version, but now the algorithm, the Chinese stories and questions he receives 
are accompanied by visual data concerning the meaning of the Chinese characters. For 
example, for the Chinese sentence, “苹果 是 红色 的,” which means “the apple is red,” 
some additional data are provided, such that:
1.  Pictures of apple in different color accompany the syntax “苹果” (apple);
2.  The expression 红色 (red) is accompanied by examples of red objects;
3.  Finally, the sentence “苹果 是 红色 的” is accompanied by a picture of a red apple 
and graphical data indicating the subject of the sentence is the apple and predicate 
is to be red.
Provided these additional data, Searle (a person) in the room would not only pass the 
Turing test, but would also begin to understand Chinese. This time, the person in the room 
would have accurate intentional states about the given Chinese symbols. In other words, 
when the person in the room reads the sentence “苹果 是 红色 的” they would associate 
it with an object (the apple) and a predicate (to be red). 
It is now clear that if the person in the room were provided some additional tools or 
data that a computer could have, they could understand Chinese. At first glance, providing 
some visual data about the world to the person in the room may not seem unfair (despite 
the fact this paper argues otherwise), since, via a camera, a computer can also collect data 
about the world. If UVCR were to be fair, it would show that there is no sound argument 
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put forward by Searle to believe that a properly programmed and adequately configured 
computer identifying relationships between syntax and the world cannot think. On the 
other hand, UVCR provides an unfair advantage to the person in the room: After all for 
the person in the room, the pictures that are associated with Chinese words are not mere 
symbols to be manipulated; they are symbols with content. That is to say, before entering 
the room, Searle already possessed the idea of what an apple is and how it seems. He 
simply associated the content of “apple,” which he had already possessed, with the syntax 
of “苹果,” as opposed to building the content of “apple” via mere symbol manipulation. 
Searle’s main conclusion that semantics cannot emerge through symbol manipulation 
cannot be debunked by UVCR as it is. However, this paper argues that the original ver-
sion of the thought experiment is also unfair to the person in the room, as it did not allow 
Searle to perceive the outside world, which is crucial for the efficiency and quality of 
understanding the process as UVCR suggests. The bottom line is that Searle’s preference 
to hypothesize a person with a semantic history in the room to test strong AI creates a 
dilemma. If we were to allow the person in the room to access perceptual data about the 
Chinese symbols, we fail to test whether semantics can emerge through mere symbols; 
and, if we do not, we are unfair to the person in the room (or computers), since perceptual 
data is an important (although, not necessary, as it will be defended later) component of 
understanding in an ordinary sense.
The common sense concept of understanding requires an accurate establishment of 
relationships between syntax and the world, i.e., the meanings of words. Individuals learn 
the meaning of a word by interacting with the external world and constructing relationships 
between words and their correspondences in the world. A person or computer manipulating 
syntax in the absence of sense data cannot establish these substantial relationships, therefore 
lacks intentionality and understanding in an ordinary sense. This is one of the reasons why 
I conclude that Searle’s original Chinese room thought experiment is set up in a way that 
is unfair to the person in the room, computers, and strong AI. It does not allow the person 
in the room to perceive the world. On the other hand, modifying his thought experiment 
as it is done in this section, only makes it unfair in the opposite sense, as UVCR lets the 
person in the room use their semantic background to make sense of Chinese symbols. The 
next section constructs a conclusive version of the thought experiment, which decisively 
proves that Searle’s argument against strong AI is not valid.
As a final remark, notwithstanding sense data’s help for fast, intuitive and in depth 
understanding, this paper defends that availability of sense data is not a necessary condition 
for understanding, which will also be defended in the following section.
A Fair Version of the Chinese Room (FVCR)
Before presenting the fair version of the Chinese room, human capacity of pattern recogni-
tion will be elaborated briefly. Humans cope with an incredibly complex world. According 
to Claude Edward Shannon’s (1988) conservative calculations, in a chess game, there are 
10120 variations (each variation is a complete possible chess game) to deduce the best 
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possible starting move. “A machine operating at the rate of one variation per micro-sec-
ond would require over 1090 years to calculate the first move! (Shannon 1988: 4)” It is 
practically impossible even for computers to process these data deductively. On the other 
hand, we humans do not have to deduce all variations to make a “good” decision, thanks 
to our pattern recognition ability. Human players categorizes chess entities like open file, 
fork, pin, mid-game, end-game, Slav formation, etc. and learn or discover advantageous 
chess moves in this conceptual space, which is much less complex than the well-defined 
variation space. In short, instead of processing all variations, humans categorize them 
and act according to which category they fall under. Recognizing patterns and making 
inferences about categories is more economical, and mostly only possible option with 
respect to cognitive resources. Now the question is, how do computers play chess if the 
game is incredibly complex? They also use pattern recognition techniques and they can be 
comparable to (and even better than) humans recognizing patterns at least in the domain 
they are designed for (Rasekhschaffe and Jones 2019). Cristopher M. Bishop (2006: 1) 
describes the aim of computational pattern recognition as the “discovery of regularities 
in data through the use of computer algorithms and with the use of these regularities to 
take actions such as classifying the data into different categories,” and underlines the fact 
that humans also have that capacity. 
Even if chess is one of paradigmatic examples of complex systems, need and use of 
pattern recognition ability is not limited to challenging practices like playing chess or 
doing science. Apparently simple tasks, like perceiving the environment, walking, speak-
ing, reading, driving, and so on, take place in complex systems, and human beings use 
their ability to recognize patterns in these domains too. To illustrate, while driving, an 
expert driver tend to recognize patterns of the engine sound and act accordingly, without 
following well-defined rules like “shift to 2nd gear when the speedometer needle points 
to 10 (Dreyfus 2004: 177).”3
Why Searle holds the view that the person in the Chinese room or a properly pro-
grammed computer would not be able to understand is his overlooking this essential 
capacity of pattern recognition and this paper will clarify how it is possible for the person 
in the Chinese room to understand Chinese, given that s/he has a moderate capacity to 
recognize patterns in the following thought experiment. 
In the final, fair version of the Chinese room (FVCR) the person entering the room is 
an alien, unfamiliar with Earth or any other planet. She has always lived in a starship with 
no windows that would have allowed her to see the space. The starship is governed by 
artificial laws of physics which are different than ours. The alien has never seen an apple, 
a car, the Sun, the Moon, and so on. The alien lives in an environment which possesses 
entirely different characteristics than Earth. Naturally, she is wholly unfamiliar with the 
English language. Then she enters the “English room” in her starship. Needless to say, 
3  For a comprehensive discussion of human ability to cope with complex environments, see Dreyfus 1972; 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2000; Dreyfus 2004. On the other hand, note that I do not agree Dreyfuses in that non-rep-
resentational learning cannot be simulated by computers.
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she is provided with certain instructions in her native language that will enable her to 
manipulate English letters correctly. In FVCR the alien is provided with English stories, 
questions and simple pictures associated with the given English words from the stories 
and questions, and she manipulates English symbols to write down reasonable answers 
to the questions. Let us assume that these stories focus extensively on simple information 
about the Solar System. For the alien, these pictures and letters are nothing more than 
meaningless symbols, as she is wholly ignorant of the referent of pictures and English 
words. With the help of instructions she is given, the alien is able to manipulate the English 
symbols accurately without any understanding about the content of the sentences she reads 
or writes. However, in this thought experiment, the alien enjoys manipulating symbols to 
the extent that she remains in the room for months. 
The diligence of the alien brings about a twist in the thought experiment: After seeing 
thousands of texts about the Solar System, she begins to realize that there are certain 
patterns in the strings of symbols in the English stories. She discovers, for example, that 
while the string of “Venus,” “Earth” or “Saturn” concludes with “is a planet;” the string of 
“the Moon,” depicted in a similar way to these planets, concludes with “is not a planet.” 
or “is a satellite of the Earth” After investigating hundreds of sentences related to planets 
and natural satellites, she creates two concepts one corresponding with our concept of 
“planet,” and a second corresponding to our concept of “satellite”. It cannot be easily be 
claimed that it would be possible for her to construct a concept of planet or satellite that 
is similar to ours. After all, her concepts, let us call them “planet′” and “satellite′” are 
constructed in the absence of detailed information concerning planets or natural satellites. 
She knows, on the other hand, that planets′ or satellites′ are in some way related to circular 
shapes in different sizes and surfaces. Another thing she notices is that circular shape a 
satellite′ is associated with is always smaller than that of the planet′ it orbits′ and mostly 
those of other planets′. She further discovers that every string that accurately concludes 
with “is a satellite.” also concludes with “is satellite of [a planet].” In other words, every 
satellite′ has a certain relationship with a planet′. In the same way, she understands that 
there is a relation, namely “orbiting around” between planets′ and the Sun′, and satellites′ 
and planets′. Moreover, she notices that every satellite′ is a satellite′ of the planet that it is 
“orbiting around′.” She suspects that being satellite of′ is equivalent to orbiting around′. 
Finally, she discovers that whatever the relation of “being bigger than” is, it is an order 
relation. That is to say, for A, B and C are different from one another, if A is bigger than 
B and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C. Consequently, upon reading that the 
Sun is bigger than Mars and that Mars is bigger than a meteor, she can now conclude that 
Sun is bigger′ than a meteor. She does not stop there, and sees that if A is bigger than′ B, 
the circular shapes provided for the strings representing A is bigger than those of B. Now, 
she accurately believes that she understands the meaning of “being bigger than”. She 
understands the meaning of “bigger than” as a human being would do in their childhood 
and she has the appropriate intentional states concerning this concept. She understands the 
meaning of “being bigger than” and this understanding does not stem from past experiences 
collected outside the English room. Note that some of the understandings provided above 
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does not require simple pictures associated with English words. The pictures which are 
analogous to sense data are not a necessary condition for understanding but a helpful tool 
for faster, more comprehensive and deeper understanding. 
Now in FVCR has the alien begun to understand English? Apparently, she has a 
degree, scope and depth of understanding of English texts like any of us. For now, the 
alien’s understanding is limited to a very small domain but whatever she understands, she 
understands in the same way we do. 
Note that FVCR reveals only one possible outcome about the English room. Therefore, 
FVCR does not show that any alien would start understanding in the English room. It is 
true that depending on the instructions the alien is given and pattern recognition capa-
bilities and cognitive tendencies of her, she could get confused in the room and may not 
understand anything about English symbols, no matter how long she stays. To illustrate, she 
may wrongly assume that pictures associated with English words are not representations 
of sense data signified by the words but they themselves are some additional signifiers, or 
her memory or pattern recognition capability may not be enough to see the relationships 
in complex texts. On the other hand, FVCR shows that some aliens which have necessary 
pattern recognition capabilities and motivation would start understanding in the room. 
Demonstration of this possibility is enough to negate Searle’s view that strong AI is false. 
It may be claimed, on the other hand, that what the alien learnt and understood in the 
English room is all about the Latin symbols and syntax of English language, not about the 
world. Assuming that she does not have access to pictures associated with English words, 
this claim would be even more appealing. After all, for the alien, the string of “planet” 
does not signify the celestial objects we call “planets”. Yet, this is not because she does 
not construct concepts about the entities in the world, which strings of Latin symbols 
could possibly refer to but because her concept of planet′ is much less complete than 
that of ours. Throughout the time the alien spent in the room, she has been constructing a 
concept of  planet′ reference of which she has very little knowledge, just as we do when 
we clumsily construct a concept of a “wave function” while reading an advanced article in 
quantum physics with almost no prerequisite knowledge. In short, I assume that the alien 
in the English room knows that these Latin symbols are meant to express propositions 
about the world, just as the Searle in the Chinese room does know that Chinese symbols 
are related to the world. Someday, let us say she arrives on Earth and begins to perceive 
our world including the planets, the satellites and the Sun within our solar-system. In this 
case, she would start to deepen her understanding of the English language and our world 
far more progressively and convergent to our understanding. This article defends that 
FVCR shows that Searle is mistaken in that he would not understand Chinese in the room. 
Moreover, I suspect that FVCR may not be necessary to show that Searle is mistaken. It 
can be argued that with or without English instructions, the person in the original Chinese 
room could, in principle, understand Chinese, if they are given enough time and, hence, 
the necessary experience about meaningful Chinese texts. This conclusion is evident in 
the fact that while new-born babies perceive the world via meaningless symbols, they 
somehow make sense of the world without instructions on how to manipulate them. They 
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naturally experience reality, recognize discernible patterns in it and map the meaningless 
symbols onto the world.  If a new-born baby can understand a new language without 
any instructions, then it should be possible for Searle in the Chinese room to understand 
Chinese with or without instructions.
Another question in need of an answer is how is the task assigned to the person in 
the Chinese room related to the strong AI, which is the thesis that a properly configured 
and programmed computer can think in the same way we do? This article defends that 
a person’s success in understanding Chinese in the Chinese room is neither a necessary, 
nor a sufficient condition for strong AI: It is not a sufficient condition: In this section it 
is shown that a person with human cognitive capacities could pass the English-room-test 
(or the Chinese-room-test); yet, this does not conclusively show that a computer could 
accomplish the same task by using pure symbol-manipulation, since we do not agree on 
the premise that all cognitive capacities of humans are based on computational symbol 
manipulation. To clarify, an alien could learn a language solely by manipulating sym-
bols; but while she is doing so, she is using various cognitive processes (consciousness, 
various reasoning methods, experiencing qualia, pattern recognition, and so on) and it is 
not obvious that these cognitive skills could all be replicated by algorithms on symbol 
manipulation. Assuming that all of a person’s cognitive capacities are based on symbol 
manipulation to show that a computer working on symbol manipulation can think in the 
same way a human does, would suffer from a circularity problem. 
On the other hand, a person’s success in understanding Chinese in the room is certainly 
not a necessary condition for strong AI either: There are numerous ways (algorithms) 
of manipulating symbols, and the person in the Chinese room uses only one particular 
way of it, which is defined by “the instructions in English.” Even if we agreed that it 
is impossible for an ordinary person in the Chinese room to understand Chinese with 
one specific algorithm and one set of cognitive skills s/he possess, this does not provide 
conclusive evidence that no person in the room can understand Chinese regardless of 
the instructions s/he follows or the cognitive skills s/he possesses. Accordingly, Searle’s 
version of the Chinese room, and his premise that the person in the room could no way 
understand Chinese, does not show that no computer can think no matter what algo-
rithm it uses and how it is configured. After all, a person in a “Fibonacci room” with no 
knowledge of Fibonacci numbers cannot calculate Fibonacci numbers, if s/he is given 
an inaccurate set of instructions but this does not show that no computer can calculate 
Fibonacci numbers, no matter which algorithm it uses. Just like it is still possible that a 
properly programmed computer can calculate Fibonacci numbers, it can still be possible 
that properly programmed computer can understand just as humans do.4
Therefore, the Chinese room thought experiment is not directly related to strong AI 
thesis. The Chinese shows only that a computer’s passing the Turing test does not guar-
antee that it thinks and understands in the way humans do.
4  See Churchlands’ (1990: 35) luminous room argument in response to the Chinese room.
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Searle’s Response to the Robot Reply
I defend that even without perceptual data, a person with pattern recognition capability, 
could, in principle, begin to understand a foreign language that they are manipulating. This 
is where the position of this paper differs from “robot reply,” or any understanding which 
holds the view that perceptual (sense) data is necessary for understanding. However, the 
availability of perceptual data would enormously boost degree, scope and depth of their 
understanding. This is why, in this section, I will discuss “Robot Reply” in relation with 
human/computer capacity of pattern recognition. 
Like Jerry Fodor5, I find Searle’s response to robot reply unconvincing (Searle 1980: 
431):
[T]he addition of such “perceptual” and “motor” capacities adds nothing by way of under-
standing, in particular, or intentionality, in general, to Schank’s original program. To see this, 
notice that the same thought experiment applies to the robot case. Suppose that instead of the 
computer inside the robot, you put me inside the room and, as in the original Chinese case, 
you give me more Chinese symbols with more instructions in English for matching Chinese 
symbols to Chinese symbols and feeding back Chinese symbols to the outside. Suppose, un-
known to me, some of the Chinese symbols that come to me come from a television camera 
attached to the robot and other Chinese symbols that I am giving out serve to make the motors 
inside the robot move the robot’s legs or arms. It is important to emphasize that all I am doing 
is manipulating formal symbols: I know none of these other facts. I am receiving “informa-
tion” from the robot’s “perceptual” apparatus, and I am giving out “instructions” to its motor 
apparatus without knowing either of these facts. I am the robot’s homunculus, but unlike the 
traditional homunculus, I don’t know what’s going on. I don’t understand anything except the 
rules for symbol manipulation. Now in this case I want to say that the robot has no intentional 
states at all; it is simply moving about as a result of its electrical wiring and its program. And 
furthermore, by instantiating the program I have no intentional states of the relevant type. All I 
do is follow formal instructions about manipulating formal symbols (Searle 1980: 420).
First, I agree with Searle in that the robot version is not fundamentally different from 
the original thought experiment; but, unlike Searle, I defend that in both versions, given 
enough time, a human being would begin to make sense of the symbols. More precisely, 
with the lines of thinking in the FVCR, Searle in the Chinese room would begin to. It is 
evident, with the line of thinking in the FVRC, Searle in the Chinese room connected to 
a robot or Searle in my skull connected to my nerves could begin to recognize patterns 
in the symbols he is manipulating, discover relationships in them and consequently 
understand the meaning of symbols (or signals.) Even though Searle, when in the room 
connected to the robot does not perceive the outside world directly, he is fed by Chinese 
characters representing the sensory data coming from the camera attached to the robot. 
5  I do not agree with Fodor’s initial comment on the Chinese room stating that “[I]nstantiating the same pro-
gram that the brain does is not, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for having those propositional attitudes charac-
teristic of the organism that has the brain. If some people in Al think that it is, they’re wrong (Searle 1980: 431).” See 
also Fodor 1991.
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After processing these symbols, Searle sends back Chinese characters that manipulate 
the motors which move the robot. As far as we know, this is remarkably similar to how 
a human brain works. It perceives the world by electrical signals (symbols) and acts on 
outside signals by again using electrical signals. When the Searle in the Chinese room 
receives the Chinese characters representing the sensory data of an apple (without know-
ing that the syntax represents the apple), he might question whether this representation 
has a certain relationship (being in color) with syntax representing sense data of “red” or 
“green”. After all, Searle has previously manipulated and recognized patterns in countless 
texts containing Chinese symbols representing sense data of red and green apples that 
the robot he is connected interacted with. So, Searle by sending certain symbols to the 
robots visual components, may check if it is  red or green (more precisely, if it has certain 
relationship with symbol patterns representing red or green)If the apple is green, Searle 
(ignorant about the real nature of apple, green or red), might decide to send certain sym-
bols to obtain a (metaphorically speaking) pleasurable string of symbols, and this way, 
would cause the robot to eat the green apple and direct the robot to enter into a goal state.
It is true that Searle in the Chinese room connected to a robot would also be unaware 
what he is doing in an ordinary sense at least, at the beginning. He would be unaware 
that the apple is something to be eaten and its color is an electromagnetic property of the 
apple. He would be unaware of many things that we know about apples, because he is 
not receiving the same symbols that we do, and he is not manipulating the symbols via 
a similar mechanism that a human brain does. However, he would begin to understand 
symbols he is manipulating. and by time, in the same way as the alien in the English room, 
his understanding would be sharpened And after a while, perhaps, he would be aware of 
some facts that we are not aware about apples, the color of green and red (again because 
he is not fed by the same data we are fed with and algorithm he follows is different from 
the one our brains does). Moreover, I admittingly speculate that if the Searle’s mechanism 
of manipulating the symbols were similar to that of a brain, how he understands the world 
would eventually converge with our way of understanding.
Conclusion
In essence, Searle’s argument against functionalism, the robot reply and strong AI ignores 
a capability that both human beings and properly programmed computers share: pattern 
recognition. Human beings are capable of capturing patterns in complex inputs, consciously 
and unconsciously. In recognizing patterns, our nervous systems (mostly unconsciously) 
filter insignificant variables and allow us to make sense of complex electronic impulses 
that represent the world. Accordingly, pattern recognition is one of the tools we use to 
invent or discover meaningful higher-order concepts hidden in meaningless symbols (like 
Chinese letters or electrical signals). Meaning and understanding concerns these patterns 
hidden in these incredibly complex electrical signals (or Chinese letters in the Chinese 
room) coming from our sense organs. 
The Chinese room, as it is, does not disprove strong AI, as shown in the fair version 
of the Chinese room: it is possible for the person in the room to understand Chinese if 
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they are provided with enough time and possess a moderate capacity to recognize patterns 
emerging in the symbols they manipulate. Understanding Chinese in the room would be 
even easier and faster if the person in the room were fed by (familiar or alien) audiovisual 
data coming from outside, since our brains have specifically evolved to recognize patterns 
in these kinds of sensory data. Arguably, two of the “mysterious” causal powers of the 
brain that puzzles Searle are 1) the brain’s pattern recognition capacity  and 2) the brain’s 
capacity to construct relationships between sets of symbols (as our brains do when we 
relate the word “table” to some visual data belonging to a table).
Intentionality, artificial pattern recognition and artificial concept creation are central 
issues for strong AI. Mechanism(s) by which meaningless sensory data result(s) in hu-
man-like understanding/thinking continue to remain a mystery; however, Searle fails to 
provide any convincing evidence that the brain is the only physical structure capable of 
human-like thinking or that the causal relationships formed by the brain are the only pos-
sible relationships that could provide the foundation for thinking to emerge. I believe that 
intentionality can be reduced to a set of well-defined functions, which can be realized in 
various types of hardware composed of different materials, including the brain, computer 
hardware or any other structure providing the opportunity to represent and manipulate 
dynamic complex relationships. Provided that algorithms that efficiently recognize pat-
terns, create concept, and bind the concepts to the world could be constructed, I do not 
see why computers categorically may not think.
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